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THE TAYLOR CASE DEMONSTRATES THAT 
THE SUPREME COURT CAN ADOPT A 
BROADER DEFINITION OF 
"COMPENSATION" THAT INCLUDES 
MEDICAL EXPENSES 
This court concluded in Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 743 P.2d 1183 
(Utah 1987) that "compensation" includes payment of medical expenses. Id. at 
1185-1186. In arriving at this conclusion this court cited Professor Larson's 
treatise on workers compensation law, which states specifically: "the 
Compensation Expenditure. . .includes not only wage benefits...but hospital and 
medical payments as well. . .it is the correct result even if the reimbursement 
provision speaks only of 'compensation' paid." Id. at 1186 (quoting 2A A. Larsen, 
Workers' Compensation Law § 74.33). Despite this specific and straightforward 
language cited in Taylor, claimant contends that this court did not hold that 
"compensation" includes medical benefits. In Taylor, however, the context of the 
then version of Section 34A-2-106 (2005)l required this court to adopt a broader 
interpretation of "compensation" to include medical benefits in order to prevent 
double recovery of medical benefits in third party actions. Indeed, if the employer 
and/or insurance earner were not "liable" for medical expenses as 
"compensation", then, under claimant's interpretation of Section 34A-2-106, 
medical expenses could not be subrogated at all because they are not specifically 
1
 The version at the time was Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-62 (Supp. 1987). 
i 
mentioned in the statute. As discussed in WCF's opening brief, the Taylor 
decision demonstrates that this court can and does apply the more general 
definition of "compensation" outlined in Section 34A-2-102(3), depending on the 
context of the statute. 
Claimant believes that the court of appeals properly relied on Kcnnccott 
Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1975) and 
Christensen v. Industrial Commission, 642 P.2d 755 (Utah 1982) to reach the 
conclusion that medical expenses are not "compensation" subject to 
apportionment under Section 34A-3-110 of the Utah Code. However, as argued in 
WCF's opening brief, the circumstances of both Kennecott and Christensen are 
distinguishable from the instant case. Those cases both involved interpretation of 
the statute of limitations. If the more general definition of "compensation" had 
been used in that context, it would have rendered the separate statute of limitations 
for indemnity benefits meaningless because medical benefits, under the then 
workers compensation scheme, could persist indefinitely. As a result, this court 
considered medical benefits separately from "compensation" for this one narrow 
purpose. The context of the statute of limitations in relation to the indemnity 
benefits statute and the inherent conflict between the two required a more narrow 
definition of "compensation" in order to give meaning and effect to both statutes. 
The Taylor case was decided after both Kennecott and Christensen and yet 
this court still applied the more general definition of "compensation." This is a 
clear indication that the narrow definition of "compensation" used in Kennecott 
2 
was not to be applied to all future interpretations of the word "compensation" 
outside of the context of the statute of limitations, or some other context where a 
more narrow definition is appropriate. In the instant case, there is no conflict 
created by applying the more general definition of "compensation" under Section 
34A-2-102(3). It was unnecessary for the court of appeals and Labor Commission 
to have reverted to the rule of statutory construction in Kennecott and Christensen 
to resolve a conflict between statutes. 
Finally, claimant argues that a lack of a legislative amendment to the term 
"compensation" in the Utah Labor Code since the Kennecott and Christensen 
decisions signifies an implicit adoption of the narrow definition of "compensation" 
used in those cases. Using this same reasoning, the general definition of 
"compensation" used in Taylor should govern because it was decided after 
Kennecott and Christensen and there has been no legislative amendment changing 
that definition since. The legislature, however, has had no reason to amend the 
term "compensation" because it has a general definition of that term in Section 
34A-2-102(3) of the Workers Compensation Act. 
i 
II. 
BASED UPON THE DEFINITION OF 
"DISABILITY" IN SECTION 34A-2-102(6), THE 
TERM "COMPENSATION" IN SECTION 34A-3-
110 DOES INCLUDE MEDICAL EXPENSES 
The Workers Compensation Act defines "disability" as "an administrative 
determination that may result in an entitlement to compensation as a consequence 
of becoming medically impaired as to function. Disability can be total or partial, 
temporary or permanent, industrial or noninduslrial." Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
102(6) (emphasis added). This definition of "disability" also applies to "payments 
and benefits provided for in . . . [the] Occupational Disease Act." Id.y Subsection 
(3). This definition of disability includes the term "compensation", which, as fully 
argued in WCF's opening brief, also includes medical expenses. 
Claimant argues that medical expenses are not included in Section 34A-3-
110 because that section only uses the terms "disability" or "death." However, as 
discussed in WCF's initial brief, under the Occupational Disease Act, a cause of 
action for occupational disease arguably does not even arise until the employee 
has suffered a disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-3-108(2)(b) (2005). Section 
34A-3-107 provides that "the disabled employee is entitled to medical, hospital 
and burial expenses . . .," Id. § 34A-3-107(2) (emphasis added), which implies that 
the employee must be disabled before he is entitled to any benefits under the 
Occupational Disease Act. 
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If a cause of action under the Occupational Disease Act does not arise until 
an employee has suffered a disability, then a more general definition of disability 
as a loss of bodily function, as opposed to disability from employment, makes 
more sense. In fact, this general definition of "disability" has arguably already 
been adopted by the legislature in Section 34A-2-102(6), which defines disability, 
in part, as being "medically impaired as to function." Id. § 34A-2-102(6). The 
statute makes no mention that a loss of work is required for an employee's injury 
to be considered a disability. If the term disability required loss of work, then an 
employee who suffers an occupational disease and only seeks payment of medical 
expenses would not have a cause of action to recover those benefits because he has 
not yet lost work as a result. It is doubtful that the legislature intended this result. 
WCF agrees that had the legislature specifically included the phrase 
"medical care and treatment" along with "disability" or "death" in Section 34A-3-
110, then this appeal would be unnecessary. However, the legislature has given 
adequate guidance in both the Occupational Disease Act and the Workers 
Compensation Act to demonstrate that the term "disability" in section 34A-3-110 
does indeed include apportionment for medical expenses. 
^ 
III. 
THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE REASON TO 
DEPART FROM THE GENERAL DEFINITION 
OF "COMPENSATION" UNDER SECTION 34A-
3-110 
If there is no legitimate reason to depart from the general definition of 
"compensation" in 34A-2-102(3) under Section 34A-3-110, then the general 
definition should apply. Claimant cites eight provisions in the Utah Labor code 
that he contends distinguish medical benefits from compensation benefits. 
Claimant then argues that this same distinction should be made throughout the 
whole Utah Labor Code where the term "compensation" appears. However, as 
argued in WCF's opening brief, this court should only depart from the general 
definition of "compensation" outlined in 34A-2-102(3) when there is a legitimate 
reason to do so. WCF agrees that within the context of the eight provisions cited, 
a narrower definition of "compensation" is appropriate. However, claimant has 
failed to adequately demonstrate a legitimate reason why the context of 
"compensation" in Section 34A-3-110 requires a more narrow definition. 
In fact, one should come to a completely opposite conclusion as claimant in 
interpreting the eight statutes cited in his brief. These eight citations demonstrate 
that medical expenses should only be considered separate from "compensation" 
when the legislature has specifically drafted such a separation in the statute itself. 
This interpretation lends support to the argument that only the general definition of 
"compensation" outlined by the legislature in section 34A-2-102(3) should apply 
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unless the legislature itself has specifically deviated from that definition within a 
specific statute itself or if this court deems there is a good reason to do so. The 
general definition of "compensation" should apply in the instant case since the 
legislature has not specifically separated medical expenses from the term 
"compensation" in 34A-3-110 and the claimant has failed to adequately 
demonstrate a good reason for deviation from the general definition. 
Petitioners also contend that there are provisions of the Utah Labor Code 
that require the more general definition of "compensation" under Section 34A-2-
102(3). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court applied the more general definition of 
"compensation" when it held in Taylor v. Industrial Commission, 743 P.2d 1183, 
1185-1186 (Utah 1987), that under Section 35-1-622, "compensation" does include 
medical expenses. 
IV. 
SINCE THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT 
AND THE OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE ACT 
ARE SEPARATE ACTS, THE ANALYSIS OF 
THE UNIFORM APPLICATION OF LAWS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH STATE 
CONSTITUTION IS UNECESSARY 
Claimant, for the first time, has argued equal protection or uniform 
operation of laws should be applied in this case. The equal protection and uniform 
operation of laws argument was not considered by this court in granting certiorari 
in the instant case. Nevertheless, since this court can affirm on any grounds, even 
2
 Now codified as Utah Code Annotated § 34A-2-106. 
n 
one not considered by the court of appeals or Labor Commission, WCF now 
addresses that issue. 
Claimant notes that although there is apportionment under the Workers 
Compensation Act for permanent partial disability benefits, medical expenses are 
still paid in full for those workers. Claimant argues that to deny full payment of 
medical expenses to workers covered under the Occupational Disease Act whose 
compensation is apportioned under 34A-3-110 would violate uniform operation of 
laws and equal protection. The two Acts, however, operate under different 
schemes to determine benefits of workers suffering from a workplace accident or 
those suffering from an occupational disease. For example, in the industrial 
accident scheme, this court has created the Allen test, which is used to determine 
legal causation when an injured worker "suffers" from a preexisting condition. 
Allen v. Industrial Commission 729 P.2d 15, 25-27 (Utah 1986). If legal 
causation, along with medical causation, is shown, then, under the Allen test, 
medical expenses are paid in full. There is no similar test to establish legal 
causation of an occupational disease under the Occupational Disease Act. Indeed, 
in Kcosta v. Labor Commission, 2002 UT App 67, 44 P.3d 819, the Utah Court of 
Appeals apparently recognized that, had the claimant there filed her claim as an 
occupational disease (cumulative trauma), she would not have had to show legal 
causation. Id., ffif 4, 31, 44 P.3d at 821, 826-27.3 Absent such a test to establish 
3
 The court of appeals concluded that the ALJ had improperly raised the theory of 
cumulative trauma sue sponte. Id., ^[ 33-34, 44 P.3d at 827. 
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legal causation of an occupational disease, medical expenses should be 
apportioned under 34A-3-110 just as is done with the other types of compensation 
in that section. There is no issue of uniform operation of laws because the 
Workers Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act clearly operate 
under differing schemes and are distinguishable from one another. Since the 
Workers Compensation Act and the Occupational Disease Act are two separate 
acts, the analysis of Uniform Operation of Laws is unnecessary. It is true that the 
two acts together provide the exclusive remedy for workers that are injured by an 
accident or occupational disease from their employment. They also share some 
definitions and provisions, but they are still considered separate acts. 
The claimant wrongly assumes that the individuals injured by a workplace 
accident covered in the Workers Compensation Act and the individuals suffering 
from an occupational disease covered in the Occupational Disease Act are one and 
the same. It is doubtful that the legislature would have passed two separate Acts if 
the two different classes created in each act were to be considered the same. The 
legislature has kept these two acts separate. Thus, the classes of individuals 
created in the two acts must be considered separate for a uniform operation of law 
analysis. 
Claimant would have this court conduct a uniform operation of laws 
analysis by comparing the operation of two separate acts. Petitioners are unaware 
of an instance in which the Utah Supreme Court has conducted a uniform 
operation of laws analysis by comparing classes of individuals that fall under two 
separate Acts. The Clause appears only to require uniform operation of the 
provisions of a single act to the class of individuals created within that single act. 
There is no issue in the instant case whether individuals covered under the 
Occupational Disease Act are treated differently from one another. There is 
simply no need for this court to conduct a uniform operation of laws or equal 
protection analysis. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above discussion, this court should reverse the court of 
appeals and remand the case to the Labor Commission for further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of April, 2008. 
FloydGv Holm 
Attorney for Petitioners 
4
 As already noted, WCF has argued that since there is a dispute in the medical 
evidence regarding the extent of apportionment, that issue should be referred to a 
medical panel under Section 34A-2-601 of the Utah Code 
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